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Reinventing the Wheel? Locai Government and Neo-Traditionai
Authority in Late-Coioniai Northern Sudan*
By Chris Vaughan
Durham University (christopher.vaughan@durham.ac.uk)
I know all about councils—talking themselves white in the face
And deciding on what suits nobody and doing it all over the place.
This quotation from a piece in a 1950s issue of Punch, entitled "Fmstrated Export to New
Britain," is a cynical comment on the establishment of elected local councils in Britain's
imperial territories after World War II.' It amused the director of local government in
Sudan sufficiently for him to keep it among his personal papers. But the image of "talking
themselves white in the face" hints at how the introduction of "Lx)cal Government" in the
British Empire was part of a wider project of postwar imperial policy to make "other"
political cultures look less "other" and more like the métropole itself. Imperial subjects
sitting on councils were now ordering their business in line with metropolitan models of
ritualized council meetings, thus partially entering what was still a privileged sphere of
whiteness. In doing so, they were imagined by the colonial state to become statesmen of
the future, authentically local, yet simultaneously modern leaders of their communities,
able to speak both the language of their people and the language of the bureaucratic state.
But they were also hoped to form a bulwark against the spread of nationalism among local
communities. Local govemment was thus envisaged as both a disciplinary training ground
for future political independence as well as a means of stalling movement towards that
very eventuality.
The "second colonial occupation" of post World War II British-ruled Africa, and
the resistance it provoked, has received much attention from historians.^ Nevertheless,
among the compelling narratives leading up to decolonization, shifts in the structures of
local government have been accorded less study than they deserve.^ Reform of local
* This article draws on my MA thesis completed under the supervision of Justin Willis, and on research
from my Ph.D. project, supervised by Cherry Leonardi. My thanks to both supervisors, and to Philip
Williamson, Iris Seri-Hersch, Chris Prior, Alden Young, Will Berridge, and the anonymous reviewers of
IJAHS for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
' P. Hubbard, "Frustrated Export to New Britain," Sudan Archive, Durham, UK [hereafter SAD]
798/2/16.
2 J. Iliffe, A History of Modern Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 436.
^ Ibid., 481-84; B. Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination
(Lx)ndon: James Currey, 1990), 309-12, and F.G. Burke, Local Government and Politics in Uganda
Copyright © 2010 by the Board of Trustees of Boston University.
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administration might at first sight fit easily into narratives of late-imperial modernization
projects, and moves towards self-government. As "modem" institutions of local
government, councils were intended to facilitate development, not to hold it back as
"traditional" authorities might. John Cell writes in a standard history of the British Empire
that "once the British began to think seriously about the possibility of African self-
government. Indirect Rule was discarded.""* Killingray and Rathbone argue that after
World War II "the educated elite was enlisted as a partner of the colonial state; traditional
rulers and the systems of authority slowly assembled in the inter-war years were
abandoned and gradually wound down."^ But to what extent is this an accurate portrait of
postwar local administration? Mamdani takes a far more skeptical view:
elected representatives rubbed shoulders with appointed traditional leaders in
ethnically defined district councils. Meanwhile on the ground administration
remained a chiefly affair. The point of the reform, after all, was to weld together a
coalition of traditional leaders and middle strata through a process of concession
and conciliation short of doing away with ground-level despotism.^
In this view, then, local government was a cosmetic change, intended to buy time for
colonial government to make more effective bargains with an ever more demanding
educated elite, while real local power remained in the hands of the established allies of the
state, so-called "traditional" notables or chiefs. Eckert also argues specifically of late
colonial Tanganyika that "local government" was really "indirect rule with a representative
outlook."^
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Sudan (in practice a British-ruled territory) was
very much a participant in the move towards conciliar forms of local government after
1942. Government rhetoric presented local councils as a "laboratory for self-government."^
Councils were to be defined territorially, not ethnically, bringing together rival groups
under a single administrative unit, in order to encourage a broader political outlook that
would benefit a future independent Sudanese nation-state. They were elected bodies,
intended to inculcate a culture of local electoral democracy. But narratives of a new agenda
in the late colonial period and of "progress" or "evolution" towards a more "modern"
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964). See A. Eckert, "Useful Instruments of Participation? Local
Government and Cooperatives in Tanzania, 1940s to 1970s," International Journal of African Historical
Studies 40, 1 (2007), 97-118.
^ J. Cell, "Colonial Rule," in J.M. Brown and W.R. Louis, eds.. The Oxford History of the British
Empire. Vol. 4: The Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 250.
^ D. Killingray and R. Rathbone, "Introduction," in D. Killingray and R. Rathbone, eds., Africa and the
Second World War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), 6. See also J. Lewis, Empire State-Building: War and
Welfare in Kenya 1925-1952 (Oxford: James Currey, 2000), 84.
M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 104.
^ Eckert, "Local Government," 102.
^ D. Newbold, "Notes for a Lecture to the Arab Centre at Jerusalem," October 1944, in K.D.D.
Henderson, The Making of the Modern Sudan (London: Faber, 1953), 531.
Local Government and Neo-Traditional Authority in Late-Colonial Northern Sudan 257
system of govemment can be challenged, as Mamdani's view suggests. While Daly claims
that local govemment in Sudan represented a "major theoretical reorientation," Gaafar
Bakheit argues that it was simply a front to make traditional authority more acceptable in a
period of supposed "modemization."^ Indeed, by requiring traditional leaders to perform
local govemance in new ways, in the form of British-style meetings, motions, and debates,
councils demonstrated the capacity of these men to perform new roles as leaders of
colonially ordered modernity. While municipal and town councils opened up opportunities
to the emergent educated elite, bringing about some genuine change in urban political
culture, rural councils served to perpetuate the dominance of the neo-traditional elite.
However, the chiefs of the postwar period often had a very different background to the
rural notables of the earlier years of colonial rule.
One result of colonial education policies that overtly favored the sons of chiefs was
that the cultural gulf between the urban, educated effendia and the younger generation of
"traditional" leaders, though sometimes still deeply felt, was also often more imagined
than real. Chiefs, or nazirs as they were called in Northem Sudan, were being transformed
by their own strategies of govemance or by the facts of their upbringing into colonially
educated leaders of change and "modemity," a shift that Bakheit's analysis does not really
take into account."^ The historical importance of "Local Govemment" is to some extent in
its facilitation and legitimization of such transformations, and in bringing educated elites of
both town and country together in the grind of local administration.
There has been a certain amount of nostalgia within Sudan for the councils of the
late colonial period as examples of genuine decentralization within Sudan's administrative
structures, mainly among an urban educated elite and official class who benefited from the
opportunities that local govemment reform afforded." And colonial councils do appear to
have been relatively representative, in comparison to the ever-increasing "politicization" of
local administration by central government appointees in recent times. But this article
argues that councils (much as was the case for Native Administration) were never
apolitical and never genuinely decentralized. Nationalist politics dominated the business of
municipal and town councils in particular: local govemment was rarely simply concerned
with local issues. Most importantly, councils were part of a growing centralization of
power in the hands of the late colonial state. Eckert argues of Tanzania that, despite the
rhetoric of decentralization, local government there was principally a support to the
bureaucratic authoritarianism of central government.'^ In Sudan, the role of the District
^ M.W. Daly, Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1934-56 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), 37; Gaafar Mohammed Ali Bakheit, "The Condominium and Indirect Rule," in J.
Howell, ed.. Local Government and Politics in the Sudan (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1974), 31.
' " For chiefs as agents of modernization, see S. Shankar, "Medical Missonaries and Modernizing Emirs
in Colonial Hausaland: Leprosy Control and Native Authority in the 1930s," Journal of African History 48, 1
(2007), 45-68.
' ' M. Norris, "Sudan: Administrative versus Political Priorities," in P. Mawhood, ed.. Local
Government in The Third World (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 1983), 71; author's discussion with Mohamed el-
Hassan Mohamed Abdu, retired schoolteacher, Khartoum, 27 October 2008.
'2 Eckert, "Local Govemment," 97.
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Commissioner [DC] remained essential in the business of council, and, more importantly,
new central departments were established to monitor the performance of local councils.
Late colonial councils were, then, not an intermption in the march of the centralizing
Sudanese state, but a step along that very path. They were also a way by which the
dysfunctional relationship between Sudan's riverine core and its various peripheries was
re-inscribed into political culture, as technocrats who had experienced privileged access to
higher education in Khartoum (something that the sons of rural notables much more rarely
experienced), further dominated local administration. ^ 3 As will be demonstrated in the
final section of this article, this trend towards centralized control very much continued into
the postcolonial era. Nonetheless, the surprising survival of neo-traditional authority at the
local level provided some capacity for local elites to negotiate their relationship with the
centralizing state.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that the pace of reform varied between the
various regions of Sudan. "Southem Policy," the mandate for neglect that had tried to
prevent cultural contact between northem and southem Sudan, was officially abandoned in
1947, and rapid integration of the north and south became official policy. But Marshall's
local govemment report of 1949 adopted an explicitly gradualist line towards the
development of local councils in the south. Councils established there were often
indistinguishable from the meetings of chiefs' courts, and lacked independent budgets. 14
Lawrence Buchanan, director of the Local Govemment Branch of the Sudan Govemment,
described the establishment of "practicable prototypes' of councils in Southem Sudan by
1953, but no more than this."'^ By 1960 over sixty councils across Sudan "had achieved
corporate status, those below that level being mainly in the South."'^ There was therefore a
real difference in the nature of local govemment reform between northem (including the
westem provinces of Kordofan and even Darfur) and southem Sudan. However, the
comparatively rapid pace of change in the north should not obscure the ways in which
councils there also often re-legitimized the authority of chiefs. This article focuses
primarily on local govemment in northem Sudan in order to achieve a better understanding
of the complex relationship between rhetoric and reality.
The End of "Native Administration"?
"Native Administration" was a policy intended to mle Sudan "on a shoestring" (to borrow
Sara Berry's phrase), by means of the devolution of powers from govemment officials to
13 For the clearest statement of the "core-periphery" thesis, see D. Johnson, The Root Causes of
Sudan's Civil Wars (Oxford: James Currey, 2003).
C. Leonardi, "Knowing Authority: Colonial Govemance and Local Community in Equatoria
Province, Sudan, 1900-1956" (Ph.D. thesis. University of Durham, UK, 2005), 65-74,151-52.
1^ Lawrence Buchanan, "Local Govemment in the Southem Sudan," Southem Sudan Review [This
document is a copy of a joumal article, but unfortunately no details of volume number] (November-
December 1953), SAD 797/3/51.
16 Norris, "Sudan," 55.
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"traditional" leaders.'^ Such men were viewed as the "natural" leaders of their own tribes,
which corresponded with official imaginades of primordialist ethnicities. In northern
Sudan recognizable authorities were much easier to locate than in the south, although here
too the emergence of government chiefs was more an evolutionary process developing
from the history of earlier contacts with "foreigners" rather than outright invention.'^
Legislation from the early 1920s onwards provided for the devolution of judicial and
administrative powers to rural notables, and an increasingly complex web of "Native
Courts" were set up across Sudan, with powers to pass judgement in a wide range of
criminal and civil cases. Particularly in northern Sudan these courts might concentrate
great power in the hands of individual leaders favored by the colonial administration,.'^
The powers these men wielded were then far from traditional: rather authority was
restructured within communities in thoroughly novel fashion. Sub-chiefs, or omdas, as
they were known in Northern Sudan, were also often influential members of "Native
Courts" and were a critical part of the local administrative machinery.
But Native Administration itself was never a simple matter of governing single
tribes through hereditary leaders. In practice, the establishment of Native Administrations
often meant the amalgamation of smaller ethnic groups under a larger, locally dominant
group for reasons of administrative convenience: colonial policy thereby created new
relationships of local inter-group domination. The Kababish Confederation saw the
amalgamation of nine ethnic groups under the leadership of Sheikh Ali El Tom, one of the
most favored leaders of the Condominium era.2O Local Government's amalgamations of
peoples were not always novel departures from earlier policy (the Kababish Rural District
Council mirrored the composition of the Kababish Confederation), and administrative
convenience remained the driving force behind such groupings, as it always had been.
Additionally, Native Administration was not simply an unrepresentative and
unaccountable system as compared to a democratic local government. While
administrative officials retained control over the appointment of nazirs, shartais (another
title for a senior "traditional" leader), and omdas, rural populations could by force of
protest make an oppressive leader's position untenable. Officials often consulted local
elites when appointing chiefs and sub-chiefs in order to lessen the risk of such damaging
local crises.2' This might extend to the nomination of omdas, or even shartais, by the
'^ S. Berry, "Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Resources in Africa," Africa 62,
3 (1992), 327-55.
'^ Leonardi, "Knowing," especially 77-120.
" J. Willis, "Hukm: The Creolization of Authority in Condominium Sudan," Journal of African
History Ad, \{im5),29-5Q.
20 T. Asad, The Kababish Arabs (London: Hurst, 1970), 219.
2' For two examples among many, see G.D. Lampen memoirs, SAD 734/8-9; Boustead, DC Zalingei
District to Perham, 29 April 1938, Rhodes House, Oxford, MSS Perham 536/3. For the inherent instability of
Indirect Rule, see Sara Berry, No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993^, and Chiefa Know Their Boundaries
(Oxford: James Currey, 2001).
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agawid (eiders) or sheikhs of the communities they would govem: something like an
electoral practice, and sometimes termed as such by officials.22 Finally, Native
Administration was a system of govemment created principally to govem rural Sudan:
there had been some recognition that urban areas required their own forms of
representative institutions in the guise of advisory municipal councils in Khartoum,
Omdurman, and Port Sudan from 1921.^ 3 But "traditional" authority often also retained
importance in urban settings. One example of many is the El Fasher town court, headed by
the family that had acted as chief ministers to AH Dinar, the last Sultan of the independent
state of Darfur, in the years immediately before British occupation.24
In sum, then, "Native Administration" was not a clear-cut case of goveming by
"traditional," "decentralized despots" with no room for local political rivalries to be
expressed or accountability from below to be enforced: nor was it simply a system with
legitimacy only in the countryside, lacking any relevance in urban settings. But "Local
Govemment" as a policy did nonetheless have its origins in the growing sense that changes
in Sudanese political culture, with the growth of an educated and increasingly politically-
conscious urban elite, required changes in forms of administration.
Stewart Symes, govemor general of Sudan, was ahead of his counterparts in other
imperial territories when he started to talk in 1935 about "functional dilution in
sophisticated areas"—this was three years before Lord Hailey's An African Survey was
published.25 The 1937 legislation that grew out of this thinking made allowances for
different forms of govemment in Rural Areas, Townships and Municipalities.
Municipalities and Townships were to gain partially elected councils for the purposes of
administration: rural areas could have councils, but membership of these was to be
nominated rather than elected.26 However, officials recognized the need to create a system
in which what they imagined to be "traditional" and "modern" elites could in some way be
brought together. The rhetoric of "Local Govemment" was to be applied to all forms of
local administration, urban and rural; "Native Administration," in rhetorical terms as least,
was out. It was hoped that greater involvement in local administration might defiect the
ambitions of the educated elite away from nationalist activism. Newbold, Civil Secretary
of Sudan in the late 1930s hoped that "under the ample folds of (Local Govemment's)
respectable cloak, the sons of sheikhs and the sons of effendia could lie down together. "^ '^
From the inception of local councils, then, they were never intended to marginalize the
22 Guy Moore, DC Northem Darfur District, "Note on Dar Artag unrest," 27 March 1936, National
Records Office, Khartoum (NRO), Darfur 1/31/164.
23 Lawrence Buchanan, Head of Local Govemment, Lecture to the School of Administration,
Khartoum, 1941, SAD 797/9/12.
24 Charles Dupuis, Govemor of Darfur, to Civil Secretary, 20 June 1928, NRO CIVSEC (l)/l/20/61.
For the relevance of chieftaincy in a West African urban setting, see R. Watson, "Civil Disorder Is the
Disease oflbadan ": Chieftaincy and Civic Culture in a Yoruba City (Oxford: James Currey, 2003).
25 M. Daly, Imperial Sudan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 36.
26 Norris, "Sudan," 54.
2 ' Newbold note, February 1939, in Henderson, Making, 509.
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chieftaincy elite, but rather to recognize, legitimate and encourage the increasing ties
between rural and urban, "traditional" and "modem" Sudan.
It is therefore hardly a surprise that mral councils in particular continued to be
dominated by a very similar elite to that of the Native Administration era. Rural councils in
their early years were made up of a mixture of elected and appointed members, and nazirs
and omdas were usually appointed by provincial govemors. Gedaref Rural District Council
in 1944 consisted of seven tribal leaders, two government officials and three merchants.^^
And elections in rural areas were not based on universal suffrage: rather. Native Courts
themselves might elect council members or they might be chosen at a separate meeting of
chiefs and elders.^^ This was sometimes hardly different from the ways that shartais or
omdas had previously been selected and approved by the DC under "Native
Administration." Rivalries between "big men" also sometimes continued to dominate
council business. The DC of Southem Darfur reported that Local Government was "the
name given to the umbrella covering tribalism," remarking that "to obtain approval for a
new school is regarded by one tribal leader as a personal triumph over another who
failed."^'' Darfur's govemor observed that, "(tribal) boundaries are more interesting
matters to discuss than district development.'^'
However, the dominance of the "traditional" elite was not entirely unchallenged. In
1949, Arthur Marshall, city treasurer of Coventry City Council, was commissioned to
produce a report making recommendations on local government policy to the Sudan
Govemment. He recommended that paid executive servants of the council should not also
be the decision-making members of the council, thus targeting omdas and sheikhs, who
were both paid by the council. These men should still have a key role in the judicial sphere,
as well as in tax collection and the maintenance of public order: but the vagaries of
"amateurish" tribal leaders administering local developmental projects should be done
away with.^^ Subsequently, the 1951 Local Government Ordinance banned any employees
of the council from membership of the council, either via election or via appointment.'^ ^
This provoked some resistance: at Seleim in 1952 "the family of a candidate whose
nomination paper had been rejected, arrived at the polling station, over a hundred strong to
stop the elections."3"* However, despite legislative restrictions, omdas in practice often
remained important members of councils, mainly via direct appointment by provincial
^^ Report by the Govemor General on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan
(hereafter RGG), 1944, 187.
29 Western and Northern Darfur Districts Annual Reports 1947, NRO 2.D.Fasher A 47/7/26.
30 Southern Darfur District Annual Report 1949, NRO Darfur 47/6/29.
3 ' Lampen, Govemor Darfur to DCs Darfur, "Note on Local Govemment," 28 October 1948, NRO
Darfur 6/7/18.
32 A.H. Marshall, Report on local govemment in the Sudan (Khartoum: McCorquodale, 1949), SAD,
44-^7.
33 Legislative Supplement to the Sudan Government Gazette [hereafter LS] (1951), SAD 41.
34 Sudan Monthly Record [SMR hereafter] (May-June 1952), SAD, 3.
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govemors, on the recommendations of DCs.^^ Moreover, the importance of the nazir
sitting on the council as an appointed member remained unquestioned, by Marshall or
anyone else.^^ The govemor of Darfur wrote of the necessity of keeping nazirs on councils
but out of the hurly-burly of electioneering, revealing the ambivalence of provincial
administrators towards centrally imposed "modernization":
in the turbulence of Darfur tribal politics it is very doubtful whether chiefs would
or should submit themselves to election for councils. A defeat may shake their
whole position in their tribe and the enormous prestige accruing to the hereditary or
semi-hereditary office may be lost according to the whim of an electorate.^''
It was not just in membership pattems that "Native Administration" continued to
hang over local govemment: neither was the principle of "territoriality" over "tribe"
altogether successfully imposed. In the direct elections for Merowe and Dongola Rural
District Councils in 1952, electoral wards usually matched the map of omodias. There
were complaints about the election from wards containing two otnodias but electing only
one representative; the election in one ward was boycotted for this reason.^« Electors
wanted to have a representative from their own omodia, not from that of their neighbors.
Additionally, electoral colleges for indirect elections were made up of representatives from
electoral wards that were themselves based on sheikhships.^^ Thus the units of Native
Administration continued to define the boundaries of local political communities, even if
prominent figures in the administration were barred from standing for election. Due to the
under-staffing and poor financing of the councils, they also usually depended on "Native
Administration" machinery to carry out much of the day-to-day district administration and
revenue collection."*"
None of this comes as much of a surprise: Marshall had been very explicit in 1949
in stating there was "no question of abolishing or disrupting the tribal hierarchy or Native
Administration.''^! Rather, councils were meant to be superimposed upon existing forms of
local administration, with the resulting overlap never quite clearly delimited—an "anomaly
which must nonetheless remain for a long time.'"*2 ¡n 1955^ j^je year of Sudan's
3^ See, for instance, Tibbs, "Administration in Dar Messeria," in Michael and Anne Tibbs, A Sudan
Sunset (Lynchmere, West Sussex: Michael and Anne Tibbs, 1999), 290.
^^ Marshall, Report on local govemment, 46.
3'^  Lampen, Govemor Darfur to Darfur DCs, Note on Local Govt, 28 October 1948, NRO Darfur
6/7/18.
38 SMR (May-June 1952), SAD, 3.
39 LS (1951), SAD, 67.
•^ORGG (1948), SAD, 160.
4! Marshall, Report on local govemment, 40; also RGG (1948), 160, Lampen to Robertson 29.3.49,
SAD 731/3/47.
'^^ Comments of the Sudan Government on the Marshall report, quoted in L.M. Buchanan, "Local
Govemment in the Sudan during the Condominium 1899-1956," in D. Lavin, ed.. The Condominium
Remembered, Vol. 1: The Making of the Sudanese State (Durham, UK: Center for Middle Eastem and
Islamic Studies, Durham University, 1991), 9.
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independence, Buchanan admitted frankly that "the initiative and leadership in the affairs
of rural councils inevitably comes from the tribal authorities ... without their support and
experience councils would be spineless. "'*3
Yet chiefs were not simply "traditional" mlers, and nor were late colonial chiefs
necessarily similar to their older predecessors. Many chiefs of the late colonial years had
reached maturity in the years of colonial rule and had been educated in the colonial system,
at least at the elementary level of the govemment kuttab, or sometimes to intermediate
level. In Darfur, for example, education had been so narrowly restricted to the sons of
chiefs that the younger generation of chiefs were the educated elite of the region, as
familiar with provincial towns and urban centers of state power as they were with the rural
lives of their subjects.''^ Nazir AH El Ghaali of the Habbania is an interesting case in point:
in 1945 the DC of Southem Darfur remarked with odium that "his building of a four-
roomed red brick house, his interest in wireless, newspaper, books, his manners towards
his elders are all out of place in a young nazir of a Baggara tribe and he has not the sense
to realize the gap they make between him and his followers.'"^^ A factional dispute within
the Habbania almost cost AH his position, but in the end he was supported by officials as
"a modern young man who keeps abreast of events" with "a quick brain." In short he
represented the "modem" tendencies that colonial govemment was trying to encourage in
the late colonial years. Ibrahim Musa, nazir of the neighboring Rizeigat ruled his tribe for
over thirty years, and in Ali's presence was said to become "conscious of his own lack of
education and irritated by Ali's obvious intelligence.'"*^ Generational tension thus existed
within the chieftaincy elite: these men were not simply an "old generation" opposed to
modernity. And the descriptions of Ali's habits seem to resonate with the same ambivalent
mixture of distaste and appreciation that characterized colonial attitudes towards Sudan's
effendia class.
"Traditional" leaders, young or old, used council membership as an opportunity to
display their mastery of the new forms of administrative procedure, particularly in the
theatre of council meetings. Indeed, officials perceived council procedure as one way of
better ordering and disciplining unruly tribal leaders, and adherence to it (particularly
following the mies of debate) was well thought of. One report noted a perceived
improvement in inter-tribal relations in Northem Darfur when its District Council was
created: "the procedure of council discussions and the value of orderiy debate was
previously unknown to the majority of its members.'"*^ Colonial officials were sometimes
dismissive of the capacity of councils to conduct their business efficiently: the Rtifa'a
District Council was described as "a pretty dead collection of old stiffs with little idea
"^ 3 L.M. Buchanan, address to Makerere College in Uganda, 1956, SAD 797/9/113.
^ For the extremely restricted access to education in Darfur, see M. Daly, Darfur's Sorrow
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 133-37.
45 DC Southem Darfur District (SDD) to Govemor Darfur, 5 April 1945, NRO 2.D Fasher 54/3/14.
4*5 Sherman, DC SDD, Report on Habbania-Rizeigat boundary dispute, 3 January 1949, NRO 2.D
Fasher 54/3/14.
•^7 Annual Report Northem Darfur District 1945, NRO Darfur 5/2/10.
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except that government should do this or that for them."'^ Yet amidst such dismissiveness
lie suggestions that chiefs were fully capable of performing the roles expected in council.
One DC wrote that "It fills me with awe to see the Nazir of the Shukria rise and quietly
oppose a motion put forward by his arch enemy the Nazir of Dar Bakr and then address the
chair at length instead of waving his hands in the air and screaming.'"*' The mastery of
procedure, and "good speech" gave "traditional" leaders credibility in "modem"
institutions. Of course, "good speech" was already highly regarded in Sudanese cultures:
now it was enframed within the colonial rules of the council chamber.
Councils were also thought of as training grounds for local leaders to acquire
greater qualities of "statesmanship," partially in preparation for the challenges of
independence. Amalgamations of different "tribes" in council provided particular
opportunities for chiefs to demonstrate such a capacity with regard to managing inter-tribal
relations, and thus re-legitimize their position. A prime example was the Messeria District
Council in South Kordofan. In 1953, after much negotiation between Chief Deng Majok
and Nazir Babu Nimr, the Dinka entered the jurisdiction of the Messeria Council.^^ The
use of an image of the elephant as the badge of the council, associated with Messeria
hunting and thus tribal identity, together with the very name of the council, would have
done little to aid such negotiations, which centered on allaying Ngok fears of being
dominated by the Messeria.^' But the strong personal relations between the Dinka and
Messeria chiefs at this time are now often referred back to as an example of how to
manage the complex relationship between the two groups, who use the same land for
grazing.52 Moreover joint membership of a council was less of an unequal arrangement
than earlier colonial amalgamations, which had usually directly subordinated one group to
another. Now negotiation and consensus were the watchwords, and chiefs who adapted to
this culture reinforced their own legitimacy in the eyes of the state: as DC of Messeria
District, Michael Tibbs clearly held both Babu Nimr and Deng Majok in high regard.^^
"Statesmanship" might also be demonstrated in other contexts. A.J. Arthur, writing
of Shendi District Council in 1952 stated that "councillors have not only shown eloquence
in debate but also demonstrated their realization of their duties and responsibilities." He
was referring to the fact that they "had not shirked the unpopular task of increasing
revenue to meet the ever rising tide of expenditure", approving an increase in taxation on
pump schemes (of which the entire financial committee of the council were themselves
owners).^ The council had "matured" and the nazir of the Gaaliyeen was singled out for
his "statesmanship."5^ If "statesmanship" could be learned by chiefs in a local arena, then
"^ W. Luce, Blue Nile province papers, 1948, SAD 828/2.
^^ E. Balfour, DC Gedaref District, letter to his mother, 17 October 1945, SAD 606/8/4.
50 Tibbs, Sudan Sunset, 127.
5' Ibid., 58.
5^ For instance, see http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php7article31981/.
53 See Tibbs, Sunset.
54 A.J. Arthur, DC Shendi (1951-1954), memoirs, SAD lldnin.
55 A.J. Arthur, letter to his parents, 4 April 1952, SAD 726/6/70.
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perhaps they would have a greater chance of championing and protecting local interests
against what many officials feared would be a fiercely centralizing independent Sudanese
state.
Linking Town and Conntry
Chiefs were adapting to the new structures and practices of local govemment, often armed
with experience of colonial education. However, discussion has so far been focused on
rural district councils: in the case of municipal or town councils one might expect to find a
very different kind of local political culture. It is certainly true that the councils of Sudan's
major urban centers could be led by the new educated elite: Ibrahim Effendi Ahmed of the
Gordon Memorial College chaired the Khartoum Municipal Council in 1946, and in the
same year a doctor of the Sudan Medical Service served as Vice Chairman of Omdurman
Municipal Council.^^
Perhaps even more significantly, the direct elections for local govemment seats
held in towns (in contrast to the indirect elections for mral councils) produced an often
lively culture of urban electoral politics. In 1949, Wad Medani saw an 80 percent turnout
for its council elections, and Wadi Haifa experienced similar levels of voting in 1951 when
"advice to electors was painted on walls over the town."^^ Moreover urban electoral
campaigns were often dominated by national politics and provided a new theater for the
expression of nationalist agendas, and for rival parties to strive for local dominance. Wad
Medani's elections were said to be conducted on "purely party lines" (including a "few
scuffles between political agents"); and by 1951, Shendi Town Council was dominated by
Ashigga party members (pro-union with Egypt, and linked to the Khatmiyya sect of Ismail
al-Azhari, soon to become first prime minister of Sudan).^^ This was all a matter of some
frustration for officials who hoped that loca] govemment would be immune from
nationalism, and that councils would in some way act as a buffer between local
communities and national politics, and indeed between communities and the state more
generally.^^ Officials complained in 1948 that
elections to the Khatmiyya ward of the Kassala Town Council were a fiasco in that
opposition was withdrawn in the face of powerful sectarian propaganda for the
Khatmiyya candidates. A public enquiry into the conduct of the elections
confirmed the first reports of strong sectarian pressure on the electors, but there
was no proof of illegal activities, and the two successful candidates have been
appointed to the Council.^''
In this case the state's hands were tied: indeed, allegations of uncontrolled electoral
fraud were not unusual. In El Obeid in 1952 "some voters emerged from the polling booth
56 SMR (January-February 1946), SAD, 5.
5'' Marshall, Report on local govemment, 8; SMR, May-June 1951, SAD, 3.
58 SMR (June-August 1946), SAD, 5; A.J. Arthur, Memoirs, SAD 726/7/28.
55 Marshall, Report on local government, 14, and Buchanan, "Lecture to Khartoum Cultural Centre,"
26 November 1952, SAD 797/9/42.
60 SMR (February-April, 1948), SAD, 5.
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with their voting papers still in their pockets, and were able to dispose of them profitably to
an Ashigga party agent outside, who would cast them later in the day for his own
candidate. "6'
However, nationalist politics was not all consuming even in urban centers: lively
elections could be fought on non-party political grounds. The experience of El Fasher in
1953 demonstrated just this, even in the same year as the first national election:
the people seem to have had the good sense to separate local issues from national
politics and there has been a good deal of clean canvassing in the wards in El
Fasher town. In the country areas, however, with the exception of one division,
there has been a commentable absence of candidates and the shartai's
representative seems to have won the seat without a fight.^2
But the politicization of Local Govemment was not simply confined to urban
councils. While local govemment elections in the countryside were generally much less
well attended and less vigorously contested, nationalist politics was often very much
present in the running of district councils. In the example of Gedaref mentioned above, the
amalgamation in council of the Shukria and the Fur of Dar Bakr collapsed after six years
of functioning under the weight of political tensions: each nazir supported rival political
parties, the Ashigga and the Umma (who were and union with Egypt), respectively.^3 xj^ g
two nazirs were also members of the Govemor-General's Advisory Council, an institution
with little power, but membership of which mattered a great deal to the prestige of the
individual members. Balfour, DC at the time, dryly described a "little rivalry between
them."^ Local and national politics were increasingly intertwined, not just in urban
councils but also in the Rural District Councils.
Local and national elites were thus perfectly capable of tuming reforms that were
partially intended to slow down the progress of nationalism into opportunities to pursue or
promote that very political agenda, in both urban and rural settings. The factionalism
inherent in nationalism was also translated into the workings of councils. The genie was
out of the bottle, and conciliar talking-shops could not put it back in. And supposedly
"traditional" mral elites, remote from the centers of state power, were often very much
concemed with "modem" nationalist politics: they were not simply cut off from the
opportunities that national politics provided to further reinvent and broaden the basis of
their authority and capacity for patronage. As Jocelyn Alexander puts it when discussing
chiefs and nationalism in Zimbabwe, chiefs demonstrated a clear ability to "draw on
national ... ideas and to ground them in local concems and traditions."^5
Ö1 SMR, May-June 1952, SAD, 3.
Ö2 Darfur Province Monthly Diary (DPMD), June 1953, NRO 2.D.Fasher 47/14/49.
63 RGG 1949, SAD, 185.
^ E. Balfour, DC Gedaref, letter to his mother, 8 March 1946, SAD 606/8/26.
^5 J. Alexander, The Unsettled Land: State-Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe 1893-2003
(Oxford: James Currey, 2006), 8.
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Moving beyond the importance of nationalist politics in urban and rural councils,
the idea of a bifurcated administration, separating urban and rural political cultures and
institutions, cannot be straightforwardly applied to local govemment in provincial
Northern Sudan.^^ Amalgamations of urban and rural councils were often executed by
officials, reflecting the reality that town and country were linked by economic and social
ties, and were never hermetically sealed from one another, despite the prejudices of
"sophisticated" town councilors that they would be dominated by "illiterate tribal people"
if councils were amalgamated.^^ The govemor of Darfur wrote of that province in 1948
that "towns are simply the markets and headquarters of the countryside. "^ 8 xhat said,
concerns of urban marginalization within larger district councils were real enough that
officials suggested that amalgamation should be "relegated from being a question of
principle to being a practical question of expediency to be decided on the spot."^^ in fact
reasons of financial viability often dictated official decisions to amalgamate councils,
rather than any intention to create more integrated local political communities. But it was
unusual to find examples of such amalgamations actually falling apart once they were
established.''"
Of course the sorts of towns that were amalgamated with larger district councils
were usually smaller provincial centers, not comparable to the Khartoum-Omdurman
nexus. Nonetheless, such amalgamations reflected the ways in which townspeople, even in
more heavily industrialized towns, often held on to ethnic identities brought from their
rural origins with great tenacity. Electors in Atbara, Sudan's railway town, agreed on
nominees to the Municipal Council on the basis of ethnicity, with the result that there were
very few contested seats.^' The identification of provincial towns with the surrounding
countryside was often clear in other ways too. In Northern Darfur, when Kuttum Town
Council opened its new buildings in 1954, 2,700 mounted horsemen paraded at the
ceremonial opening, reminiscent of the tribal gatherings so frequently arranged by officials
in western Sudan.'^ As argued above, chiefs themselves often straddled the worid of the
town and the country, especially in the riverine core of Sudan. One of the eariiest members
of Omdurman Municipal Council was Sheikh Ahmed Hassan Abdel Moneim, holder of the
66 See Mamdani, Citizen, for the "bifurcated state," 18.
6^ Osman Hag el Zaki, "Local Govemment Elections: A Case Study of the Eastem Area Council,
Gezira Province," in Al-Agab Ahmed al-Teraifi, Decentralization in Sudan (Khartoum: Khartoum University
Press, 1987), 197.
68 Lampen, Governor Darfur to Darfur Des, Note on Local Govemment, 28 October 1948, NRO Darfur
6/7/18.
69 SMR (May-June 1950), 2, (August-September 1954), 2 SAD; Luce papers on Blue Nile Province,
SAD 828/2; the quotation is from Sudan Government Comments on Dr Marshall's Report on Local
Government (SAD), 5.
' 0 Por example, see SMR, SAD (September-October 1954), 2, for the survival of urban-rural councils.
' " SMR (July-August 1951) SAD, 2.
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King's Medal for Native Chiefs, but also a prosperous city merchant.'^ 3 Such examples also
existed in more remote parts of Sudan. The Sultan of Dar Masalit in Darfur governed from
his seat of authority in Geneina, a border town that saw major economic and demographic
growth throughout the colonial period, but where neo-traditional authority remained vitally
important for urban administration.^^ SQ where councils govemed both towns and rural
areas, they often brought commercial, educated, and "traditional" elites together, thus
acknowledging that there was no clear boundary between these groups.
Pointing out these links between urban and mral political cultures does not mean
that distinctions between the two were non-existent. Such contrasts were particularly felt
between educated civil servants and "traditional" elites, and hinted at how the gulf between
Sudan's riverine core, and its various peripheries would become further entrenched after
independence. Officials believed that opposition by the Elementary School Teachers Union
(a Khartoum-based body) to council control of elementary education was due to a "fear of
subordination to tribal leaders (whom they disliked and despised).""^5 Many educated
Sudanese were of course not of chiefly background, particularly those who had
experienced higher education.''6 British officials noted that many graduates of what had
become University College, Khartoum were unwilling to become Executive Officers [EO]
for District Councils as they felt it "derogates from their personal ^Äera/(honour) to take
instructions from ignorant and unlettered councillors."'''^
South Darfur District Council in 1949 indeed had just three literate members out of
a total of sixteen.'^ s p^j^¿ EQS often had troubled relationships with chiefs sitting in council,
particularly where they took over some of the functions of the nazir, for instance in
supervising the collection of taxation by omdas.'^^ This was further complicated where the
EO depended on the tribal hierarchy to implement council decisions: "inside the council
chamber the tribal chiefs are the masters of the Executive Ofñcer; outside they are his
subordinates."8" But equally, such tensions also involved Executive Officers in close
working relationships with chiefs, and it was not unknown for the relatives of chiefs
'^ 3 SMR (August-September 1949), SAD, I.
"^ 4 DPMD March 1945, NRO CIVSEC (1)57/22/86.
''5 Local Govemment Branch Report 1951/2, SAD 777/7/10.
^6 Heather Sharkey's work reveals the very limited extent to which Gordon College drew in the sons of
"traditional" notables. See H.J. Sharkey, "Colonialism and the Culture of Nationalism in the Northem
Sudan" (Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1998), esp. 76. Also see The Gordon Memorial College at
Khartoum: Report and Accounts (Khartoum, 1944).
' ' R. McComas, "A Suggestion for Temporarily Modifying the Present Local Govemment Policy in
the Sudan," 1954, SAD 798/1/4.
'^ ^ Southem Darfur District Annual Report 1949, NRO Darfur 47/6/29.
"^^ Tibbs, DC Dar Messeria to Govemor Kordofan, 18 April 1954, in Tibbs, Sunset, 278.
^0 Galobawi Mohamed Salih, quoted in Howell, Local Government, 89.
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themselves to take on such executive roles, once again demonstrating that "traditional"
families were often very much part of the educated elite.^'
The Persistence of Central Control
The rhetoric of colonial government and rose-hued memories of the late colonial period
have conspired to suggest that local government in 1940s and 1950s Sudan was a more
genuinely devolved system of local governance than earlier or later systems. But in fact the
establishment of local councils went hand in hand with efforts to increase control of local
administration by central government. And the district commissioner often maintained a
key role in the business of local government, supervising the operation of the councils.
In the early years of conciliar local government the DC acted as chairman of the
council in almost every case, ordering the business of council.^^ The DC/chairman also
often acted simultaneously as the EO of the council.^3 Marshall pushed for a reassessment
of the DCs role in 1949: he wanted the DC to be the "midwife" of local government, with
the "delicate task of gradually transforming into representative, efficient and progressive
bodies those local authorities which are now relying too much upon the structure of native
administration."^ Eventually the DC should disappear. However, the Sudan Government
envisaged the DC continuing to enjoy ultimate control for "many years to come," and
predictably DCs themselves were "by no means unanimously behind what some
considered a trendy "urban" concept, weakening their own position and that of traditional
tribal leaders."85
As chair of the Gedaref Rural District Council in the years leading up to the
Marshall Report, Elliott Balfour expressed some dissatisfaction with his changing role: "I
found it difficult to make such a quick change from what was still almost Direct Rule to
"moving an amendment" in my somewhat colloquial Arabic. "^ ^ In letters to his mother,
Balfour complained that chairing meetings left him feeling "rather limp" (a Gedaref sheikh
once described Balfour as "pitiful").^'' Interestingly though Balfour also described the
council as
8' M. Tibbs, DC Dar Messeria, Handing Over Notes, 1954, in Tibbs, Sunset, 21 A; M. Kevane and L.
Gray, "Local Politics in the Time of Turabi's Revolution: Gender, Class and Ethnicity in Western Sudan,"
/I>ica65,2(1995),275.
^^ Sudan Administration Conference 1946: Report of Sub-Committee 'B' on Local Government (SAD)
23.
^3 Marshall, Report local government, 49.
84 Ibid., 107.
85 Sudan Government Comments, 14; T.H.B. Mynors, Assistant. Director, Local Government Branch,
Civil Secretary's Office (1950-1953), memoirs, SAD 777/8/9.
8^ E. Balfour, "The District Commissioner's Tale," in D. Hawley, ed., Sudan Canterbury Tales (Wilby,
UK: Michael Russell, 1999), 72.
8'^  Balfour to his mother, 10 May 1946, SAD 606/8/40; D. Hawley, Sandtracks in the Sudan (Norwich,
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a great way of passing the buck. Chaps can no longer come and worry the DC at all
times and hours because the answer is "The Council does not approve" or "That
must be raised to the council." And the great thing is that the DC is only chairman
and has no right to hear appeals, they must go to the Govemor.88
While this suggests a somewhat diminished role for the DC, Balfour's correspondence also
reveals him preparing council budgets, and threatening "obstmctive" chiefs with
cancellation of their proposed pay rises in order to bring them "to heel."89 The DC, even if
personally weak, retained a key directive role over council business, and thus had
important influence over local politics and administration.
Following the Marshall Report, the DCs role was gradually phased out in some
areas. In August 1951 the merkaz (district headquarters) at El Obeid was closed; the same
happened in Dongola in February 1952 and the abolition of Khartoum District Office was
approved in March the same year.^ o Elsewhere the DC may not have vanished, but he
sometimes did hand over chairmanship of "his" council.^i However, closure of the merkaz
was far from the norm. Michael Tibbs, the DC of Messeria District, remained as chairman
of the council until his departure in 1954 and recommended that his Sudanese successor
continue in this role, opposing the idea that the chairman should be elected by the
council.92 Tibbs described his first attendance at the Messeria District Council meeting:
(the EO) complimented me on looking so smart but said I should remove my
ADC's stripes, it was very important that as Chairman I did not look like a DC, the
Members might feel intimidated. So I had to go back and later appeared in shirt and
tie.93
The change in costume seems to exemplify the often-cosmetic nature of the changes in
local administration, and surely fooled no one: everyone knew who the mufettish
(inspector) was. Moreover, initiative for particular local govemment projects still often
came from DCs. A.J. Arthur was able to push a scheme for the re-planning of Shendi town
through the Shendi town council in his last year as council chairman, utilizing social
connections in the Surveys and Land departments that only an administrative "insider"
could possess.94
On a day-to-day level, staff shortages, particularly of well-trained EOs, often
meant that the DC and his staff were still executing much of the council's administrative
grind, in conjunction with native authorities: councils simply did not have the resources to
88 Balfour to his mother, 17 October 1945, SAD 606/8/4.
89 Balfour to his mother, 11 August 1949, SAD 606/8/66, and 21 October 1949, SAD 606/8/72.
90 SMR August-September 1951, 2; SMR January-February 1952, 6; SMR March-April 1952, 4
(SAD).
9' Local Govemment Branch Report 1951/2, SAD 777/7/7; SMR May-June 1952,4.
92 M. Tibbs, "Handing Over Notes Messeria District," 1954, in Tibbs, Sudan Sunset, 274.
93 Tibbs, Sudan Sunset, 82.
94 A.J. Arthur, letters to his parents, 23 May 1952, and 30 May 1952, SAD 726/6/78 and 726/6/79.
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function as genuinely decentralized centers of authority.^5 ßy 1953 twenty-five of forty
senior EOs to councils were still seconded, often only part-time, from the merkaz, and
were supervised by the DC: often they were in fact the ADC or the ma'mur.^^ This of
course led to confusion of functions between the council and the merkaz.^^ The slow rate at
which many councils gained their own buildings accentuated this confusion, as many
councils had to use merkaz offices until they obtained their own. Marshall had been very
keen to clear up this confusion, stressing the need for separate council buildings,
bemoaning the lack of time spent by EOs with their councils, and pointing out the lack of
separate uniform for council staff. But the problem persisted, some councils lacking any
sort of EO whatsoever.^8 Special training courses were provided in Khartoum University
and from 1954 in the Juba Training Center, but graduates were slowly produced, only
sixteen a year from Khartoum.99 Councils were thus often dependent on both the merkaz
and Native Administration to execute its decisions.
Significant as the DC and his merkaz were to the mnning of the councils, the days
had long gone when the DC was almost the sole representative of govemment in his
district. In the postwar period initiative in central government policy and in local projects
came increasingly from the technical departments, and councils and their chairmen had to
respond to proposals from outsiders to their district'oo Tibbs's memoir mentions the visit
of a Soil Conservation Engineer to one of the Messiria Council meetings and he comments
with some dryness:
The technical people like him and the Agricultural Inspectors were very much
inclined to whiz round the District without one's knowledge and then send in a
report on what they thought should be done. If I had known they were coming, we
could have shown them where their particular wares were needed, after all it was
our Council which had to pay for the wells or haffirs (small reservoirs) and we had
to maintain them afterwards and provide a ghaffir (guard). So I am asking them in
tum to Council meetings as part of their education.'O'
Indeed it seems clear that alongside the talk of devolution of responsibility and
preparation for self-government, councils were intended in large part to do the work of
overstretched central govemment departments and were in a sense functioning as an
additional arm of the technocratic/developmentalist state: Marshall's report had indeed
' 5 K.D.D. Henderson, Set under Authority (Somerset, UK: Castle Cary Press, 1987), 132; Luce, Blue
Nile Province papers, SAD 828/2/93.
9Ö Buchanan, "Local Govemment since 1947," SAD 797/9/46.
97 RGG (1949), SAD, 152.
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been quite frank about this intention.'"2 The establishment of the Local Government
Branch of the Civil Secretary's Office in 1949 marked the further tightening of central
power around local administration.'"3 By 1952 the Branch was becoming ever more
complex in its functions; it was handling the relations of central departments with councils,
and helping councils deal with issues arising from labor relations and local politics in
urban areas in particular. 1^4 Many of the local orders made by councils were made using
standard templates created by the Local Govemment Branch.'"^ indeed, council
regulations were one means by which the colonial state attempted to project its authority
ever deeper into the lives of its subjects. Buchanan's comic poetry collection mentions the
regulation of the "Ru Ndogo" dance by the Wau Rural District Council, which passed a
resolution that female dancers should be covered by leaves "aft and fore. "106 Another piece
is amused by the broad range of fines enforceable under Municipal Council Regulations,
for "squatting in a thoroughfare" or "planting lettuce after rain."'0'7
Most importantly of all, the Local Govemment branch employed Local
Govemment Inspectors for each province, men with wide experience of administration as
DCs, to supervise the work of councils, and sometimes taking over that role from the DC.
The disappearance of the DC, where it occurred, was then often followed by his
reappearance in new (or not so new) costume. By 1953, two of the seven provincial
Inspectors were Sudanese ex-DCs; the rest were still British.'O8 Executive Offlcers, when
they did gain their own uniforms in the 1950s, often bearing the same province badges as
the uniforms of DCs, also inherited an esprit de corps very similar in character to that of
the Sudan Political Service, suggesting the survival of a colonial culture of "bureaucratic
authoritarianism."i09 in short, it appears that in these later years of colonial rule, despite
the devolutionary rhetoric of the Sudan Government, central govemment was maintaining
and indeed acquiring even greater control over local administration. But this centralization
did not displace neo-traditional authority: in fact chiefs continued to play a key part in the
execution and negotiation of central govemment directives. This pattem very much
persisted into the period after 1956.
102 Marshall, Report local govemment, 4.
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Postcolonial Transformations and Survivals
Ironically, British administrators in the last days of Condominium Government feared the
end of local autonomy and the tightly centralized govemment that they believed Sudanese
self-government would bring,"^ as if they had not created an over-powerful central state
themselves. The implication of course was that central control was fine in responsible
British hands, but the same power in Sudanese hands would lead to difficulties. McComas,
Local Govemment Inspector of Kordofan Province, wrote in 1954 that the chances of
Local Govemment's survival in its current form were "slender," and spoke of a "natural
antipathy between Sudanese administrators and tribal hierarchies," suggesting that urbane
educated administrators would increasingly marginalize councils that they perceived to be
dominated by tribal leaders. '" Buchanan predicted the DC would play a leading role in
local govemment "for a generation or so.""2 McComas also suggested that a feeling
existed "among all classes, that councils were little more than talking shops where (and
this is true) a lot of dirty linen is washed." Moreover, "democracy ... has no roots in the
hearts of the people. Personal authority, based on status, is almost the only political theory
to be understood here.""3 Although based on embittered colonial prejudice, these views to
some extent predicted the tug of war that ensued after independence between "traditional"
authorities and the national bureaucratic elite over the exercise of local authority, and what
would be the very limited relevance of electoral representation at the local level.
However, the machinery of local government set up by the Condominium
Govemment did not vanish overnight. In some ways the postcolonial state moved faster
than its predecessor had ever dreamed of in abolishing the office of DC by 1960 and
closing the merkaz right across Sudan, in an apparent step towards a more decentralized
system of local government. This decision in essence reflected the progressive
marginalization of the DC by central government departments, resident magistrates, and
indeed by local govemment inspectors: the DC was a colonial relic and the Abboud
govemment (1958-1964) found no reason to keep the office alive. "4 The number of
councils continued to grow despite personnel and cash shortages; at the end of the 1950s
there were over sixty warranted councils in existence, and twenty-five other councils were
established. However despite the disappearance of the DC, central control over councils
was in reality further tightened under the guidance of local govemment inspectors who
were also now recognized as the warranted Local Authorities for their areas. Councils were
further reduced in autonomy by the establishment of Provincial Authorities in 1961. These
Authorities were dominated by executive offlcials representing the interests of central
• '0 Buchanan, "Local Government since 1947," SAD 797/9/47.
' ' ' McComas memo, "A Suggestion for Temporarily Modifying the present Local Govemment Policy
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government and exercised considerable control over local administration. "5 Additionally,
councils became entirely appointed bodies: the notion of electoral representation was
thrown out. 11^
From 1971, under the NimeiH regime (1969-1985), Province Councils took over
the provision of local services, and local councils, while increasing vastly in number to
over 4000 across the country and once more becoming elected bodies, became increasingly
dominated by representatives of the regime. Only SSU (Sudan Socialist Union) members
could be nominated for council election. ^ '^  Local government officers, retaining a
dominant role in the day-to-day running of the councils, now also had the explicitly
defined role of "promotion and consolidation of the political aims and ideology of the
socialist regime" as the inseparability of politics and administration was deemed vital to
the success of the "revolution." Provincial commissioners also became ever more powerful
at the expense of often inexperienced, sometimes illiterate local councillors, close to the
SSU but often commanding little respect from the communities they supposedly
represented. 118 District councils had in any case lost their corporate status and budget
making rights."^
From this outline, the history of postcolonial local government in Sudan, as
elsewhere in Africa, appears to be one of ever-greater domination by central control.'20
Nimeiri's establishment of a far greater number of councils at the local level, but with less
independent authority, displays much continuity with the British period: more talk about
local autonomy, and the apparent creation of locally representative institutions, while
creating ever more centralized oversight of local administration. The establishment of
councils in the late colonial period then looks ever more like a step in a sustained process
of the removal of authority from the local level. "Decentralized despotism" seems less
" 5 Galobawi Mohamed Salih and J. Howell, "Local Government After Independence," in Howell,
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relevant than "centralized despotism," as Mamdani himself acknowledges when discussing
the "radical" variant of the postcolonial state.'2'
Nonetheless, councils also played a different part in the continuing interactions
between the local or national, and the rural and the urban. In the late colonial period the
bureaucratic state and nationalist politics were both pushing Sudan towards an ever more
centralized system that valued scientific, technical, and bureaucratic knowledge above the
"tradition" that British policies of Indirect Rule had been trying to understand (or invent)
and then preserve. However, the establishment of councils allowed the representatives of
"tradition" to adapt their practices of govemance to this new environment. In their use of
the bureaucratic procedure of council meetings (framing motions, debating in chambers),
chiefs demonstrated their mastery of the new language of govemance, and demonstrated
(again) their ability to adapt to modernity. They could not simply be dismissed as
irrelevant to the new projects of the central state—they had reformed their role as arbiters
between the state and its subjects, now often functioning in amalgamated political
communities and forming allegiances with their counterparts in other groups to deal with
the demands of the hakuma (government). Throughout the 1960s it was widely recognized
that councils continued to be dominated by "traditional" authority.'22 Early attempts to
abolish Native Administration in the late 1960s ran up against a lack of political will in the
face of significant opposition from both loca] government officials and chiefs
themselves.'^3
Native Administration was formally abolished in 1971 after Nimeiri took power,
with the ascendancy of the idea that "traditional authority" acted as a bar on "progress,"
and chiefs were theoretically barred from membership of the People's Councils. But once
again, significant continuities remained beneath apparent change. Traditional leaders often
continued to play a key role in the assessment and collection of tax, and the families of
these leaders, now often well established in SSU organizations and commerce, remained
key local political figures.'2^ Powerful local families were able to arrange election
victories for candidates drawn from their own ranks, and nazirs and omdas sometimes re-
emerged as powerful figures in local councils alongside the nominees of the party
machinery.'25 A report on Southem Darfur rejected the suggestion that council
membership should be made dependent on literacy, commenting that, "Literacy, status and
infiuence do not always go together."'26 in the Ahadi Village Council's election in 1977
the SSU's local secretary waived his authority to approve of nominated candidates under
local pressure: a greater political pluralism sometimes existed at grass-roots level than was
' 2 ' Mamdani, Citizen, 25.
'22 Al-Teraifi and Idris, "Decentralization," 54.
'23 Gaafar Mohamed Ali Bakheit, "The Politics of Native Administration," in Howell, Local
Government, 45-64.
'24Glenworth and Idris, "Inter-Council Relations," 27.
'25 Ibid., 28, and J. Howell, "Councils and Councillors, 1969-72," in Howell, Local Government, 89-
106.
'26 Glenworth and Idris, "Inter-Council Relations," 41.
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intended by the center.'27 And while the "People's Councils" were meant to be territorial
units rather than tribally defined, often councils that amalgamated rival ethnic groups
collapsed under the weight of these rivalries, as we similarly observed in some cases from
the late colonial period.'28 Cleariy the notion that councils were bodies that should
represent particular ethnic groups had not vanished in all quarters. A study of voting
pattems in the Eastem Area Council of the Gezira in 1981 revealed that no two candidates
from the same ethnicity competed for the same seat in order to avoid splitting the vote, and
that successful candidates always came from the most numerous local ethnic group.'29
The state thus simply lacked the capacity to enforce its desire to do away altogether
with Native Administration, or indeed the "tribalism" that was perceived to lie behind
these stmctures. Neo-traditional authority has never vanished in post-independence Sudan,
although it has at times been marginalized from formal state stmctures. Indeed, when the
NIF came to power in 1989 it set about re-establishing Native Administration, recognizing
the potential mb-off effect of re-establishing what it perceived to be popularly legitimate
institutions.'30 And, of course, the survival of "traditional" authority is not just a Sudanese
phenomenon: it reflects a broader experience across sub-Saharan Africa.'3'
Conclusion
To some extent the Condominium Govemment in the 1940s and 1950s intended to
bequeath a local system of authority that would be resilient against growing central
control. Buchanan hoped that the councils and their associated tribal hierarchies "should be
able to provide an effective shield from hasty judgement and inadvertent oppression by
govemment agencies."'32 However, councils were also intended, in a contradictory
manner, to make the dealings of those same govemment agencies with local communities
somewhat less complicated, and to enable top-down developmentalist projects to be
effectively implemented. In essence these contradictory expectations between
"preservation" and "modernization" were the same as had been held in the period of
"Native Administration." And "traditional" leaders, in the late colonial period and
afterwards, continued to act as key interlocutors between state and society from within
councils themselves, both limiting and enabling the power of state authority at the local
'27 S. Harir, Old Timers and New-Comers, Politics and Ethnicity in a Sudanese Community (Bergen:
University of Bergen, 1983), 62-64.
'28 El-Tayeb El Khizaina Abdel Rahman, "Decision-Making in White Nile Province," in Al-Teraifi,
Decentralization , 126-27.
'29 Osman Hag el Zaki, "Elections," in Al-Teraifi, Decentralisation, 214-16.
'30 Kevane and Gray, "Local Politics," 275.
'31 See for instance, E.A.B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and R. van Dijk, eds., African Chieftaincy in
a New Socio-Political Landscape (Leiden: African Studies Center, Leiden, 1999); B. Oomen, Chiefs in South
Africa: Law, Power and Culture in the Post-Apartheid Era (Oxford: James Currey, 2006).
'32 Buchanan, "Circular on Local Govemment," 11 January 1954, SAD 798/1; see also Marshall,
Report on Local Government, 5, 14; Buchanan lecture to Khartoum Cultural Center, 26 November 1952,
SAD 797/9/42.
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level, as they had throughout the colonial period. As the state turned against them, their
firmly established position in local administration, acting as councilors as well as chiefs,
enabled them to at least partially weather the storms of the 1960s and 70s.
The survival of neo-traditional authority also suggests an interesting locally
centered narrative of continuity in counterpoint to the idea of larger cycles of "possibility
and constraint" at the national level. Local government reforms of the 1950s and 70s
obscured important continuities beneath rhetoric of change and progress.'33 Moreover,
successive regimes exaggerated their capacity to determine the outcomes of their reforms.
The British hoped that "Local Government" would keep nationalism at bay; the Nimeiri
regime expected that the institution of "People's Councils" would do away with
supposedly reactionary tribal chiefs. Neither government understood the capacity of
"traditional" leaders to draw on wider national political discourses to reinforce their own
position. The Nimeiri regime also failed to understand the extent to which neo-traditional
authority was irremovably enmeshed in both local and national networks of patronage and
accumulation. Chieftains were both entrenched and adaptable in ways that neither regime
fully grasped.
Mamdani's view that colonial "decentralized despotism" gave way to "centralized
despotism" in the "radical" postcolonial states (of which Nimeiri's Sudan must surely be
one) is then not fully satisfactory in the Sudanese case.i34 Firstly, "late colonialism's"
Local Government reforms had already significantly intensified central control of local
administration: this was not simply an innovation of the "radical" postcolonial state. But
more significantly, Mamdani's argument does not leave room to account for the survival of
chieftaincy even when under assault from the "radical" postcolonial state.
As recent research has demonstrated, there is no necessary contradiction in the eyes
of African citizens between electoral democracy and "traditional" authority. 135 This in
itself suggests how successful "traditional" leaders have been in drawing on what might
seem to be opposing discursive fields of "tradition" and "modernity" to create a language
of authority, which continuously re-synthesizes both discourses. Their unique mastery of
this language has made it impossible to remove them from the political landscape. "Local
Govemment" in late colonial Sudan was, then, both one stage in a sustained process of
state centralization as well as a means by which chiefs re-invented their authority in
negotiation with that very process of centralization. As such it provides further evidence to
suggest that the "characterisation of the state as technocratic and alien and rural society as
bounded and traditional," while suggesting a significant truth about a dysfunctional core-
periphery relationship in the Sudanese case, also obscures the dynamic nature of what
Steven Feierman calls "unbounded local society," and the constant interactions between
133 F. Cooper, "Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective,"
African History 49, 2 (2008), 167-96.
134 Mamdani, Citizen, 102-108.
•35 C. Logan, "Selected Chiefs, Elected Councilors and Hybrid Democrats: Popular Perspectives on the
Co-Existence of Democracy and Traditional Authority," Journal of Modern African Studies 47, 1 (2009),
101-28.
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what appear contradictory, but which are in fact mutually constituent, discourses of
authority.'36 Councils were theaters where the imagined boundaries between "state" and
"non-state," and "modemity," and "tradition" were contested, and often dissolved.
'36 Alexander, Land, 9; S. Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals (London: University of Wisconsin Press
1990), 35.
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